Do food prices cause political unrest? Throughout history, riots appear to have frequently broken out as a consequence of high food prices. This paper studies the impact of food prices on food-related political unrest using monthly data at the international level. Because food prices and political unrest are jointly determined, the number of natural disasters in a given month is used in an attempt to identify the causal relationship ‡owing from food prices and political unrest unrest. Empirical results indicate that between January 1990 and January 2011, food price increases appear to have led to increased political unrest, whereas food price volatility has been associated with decreases in political unrest. These …ndings are consistent with those of the applied microeconomics literature on the welfare impacts of food prices.
Introduction
Can food prices cause political unrest? Economic theory is quite clear on the subject. Take two households who are net consumers of food and who di¤er only in their respective levels of income. If food is a normal good (that is, if the demand for food is increasing in income), the impact of a price change on welfare will be felt comparatively more by the poorer of those two households, who devotes a higher share of its budget to food consumption. In developing countries, poor households often allocate more than 50 percent of their budget to food purchases-a proportion that increases directly as a result of increases in food price increases. For a large enough increase in the price of food, the welfare loss incurred by the poor may threaten their very subsistence, which in turn may push them toward desperate 1 This rise in food prices was associated with food riots in several developing and emerging countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Schneider, 2008; Bush, 2010) . 2 The second food crisis, 1 All the food price …gures in this paper are from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations'Food Price Index, available at http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/wfs-home/ foodpricesindex/en/. 2 The expressions "political unrest"and "food riots"are used interchangeably throughout this paper. The which began at the end of 2010 and saw food prices increase by 40 percent between January 2010 and February 2011, has culminated by the current famine in the Horn of Africa and is still ongoing. Once again, a rapid rise in food prices was associated with political unrest throughout the world, but it was perhaps most prominently associated with the so-called
Arab Spring of 2011-a series of events which began with food riots in Algeria and in Tunisia in early January 2011 (Ciezadlo, 2011) , and which led to the collapse of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and of the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Although it is not possible to assert that food prices caused the Arab Spring -the correlation between food prices and political unrest does not mean that one causes the other -this does raise the question of whether food prices cause political unrest.
To further complicate the relationship between food prices and political unrest, there appears to be a considerable amount of confusion in the media and among policy makers in discussions of how food prices may cause political unrest. For some, this means rising food prices. Economists have long known (see, for example, the seminal work of Deaton, 1989 ) that an increase in the price of a commodity, although it increases the welfare of the households who are net sellers that commodity, decreases the welfare of the relatively many more households who are net buyers of that commodity, and there are numerous instances of political unrest associated with rising food prices throughout history (Rudé, 1964; Walton and Seddon, 1994; Schneider, 2008; Bush, 2010) .
For others, this means food price volatility. At the end of January 2011, French president reader should keep in mind, however, that the two are generally not synonyms-political unrest encompasses social movements other than food riots, such as labor strikes, coups, and so on.
Nicolas Sarkozy declared that during his tenure as head of the G-20, he would make price volatility his top priority, going so far as to say that "if we don't do anything, we run the risk of food riots in the poorest countries" (Reuters, 2011) . The Brookings Institution noted in March 2011 that "the crux of the food price challenge is about price volatility rather than high prices per se (...) [i] t is the rapid and unpredictable changes in food prices that wreak havoc on markets, politics and social stability" (Kharas, 2011) . Likewise, the FAO had convened its High-Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition at the end of 2010 with the explicit goal of exploring the causes and consequences of food price volatility.
But not only has food price volatility not signi…cantly increased in recent years (Gilbert and Morgan, 2010), 3 food price volatility has been found empirically to a¤ect rural households in a developing country as follows: it decreases the welfare of net producers of food, who need to commit resources to production long in advance of realized prices, but it leaves net consumers of food largely una¤ected (Barrett, 1996; Bellemare et al., 2011) .
Given that food prices has occupied a considerable place in the development policy discourse over the last few years, this paper studies the relationship between food prices and political unrest. 4 More speci…cally, this paper looks at two research questions. It …rst looks at whether the relationship between food price levels and political unrest is causal. Because food prices and political unrest are jointly determined, however, the incidence of natural disasters (i.e., the number of unpredictable shocks to both the supply and demand of food) 3 Likewise, Jacks et al. (2011) show that although commodity prices are more volatile than the prices of manufactured goods, commodity price volatility has not increased signi…cantly over the last 300 years. 4 A precise de…nition of how "political unrest" is de…ned in this paper is provided in section 4, when discussing how each variable retained for analysis was measured.
is used as an instrumental variable in an attempt to make the food price level exogenous relative to political unrest. The idea behind this empirical setup is that a natural disaster that occurs in one part of the world a¤ects world food prices, and a change in food prices makes it more or less likely to observe food riots in another part in the world in the short term. Indeed, this is what is thought to have happened in late 2010 and early 2011, when ‡oods in Australia and droughts in Africa raised food prices, which then led to political unrest in North Africa.
Second, this paper looks at the relationship between food price levels and food price volatility on the one hand and on political unrest on the other hand in an attempt to contribute to the debate between those who argue that rising food prices cause political unrest and those who argue that food price volatility causes political unrest.
Using monthly data at the international level, the empirical results indicate that between January 1990 and January 2011, rising food prices have led to increased political unrest, whereas food price volatility -de…ned here as the standard deviation of the food price series over the previous three or six months -has actually been associated with decreases in political unrest. This is not to say that food price volatility is desirable, however, as episodes of rising food prices are generally positively correlated with episodes of increased food price volatility, and because food price volatility today can lead to decreased output -and thus higher food prices -in the future (Clapp, 2009; Naylor and Falcon, 2010) . What this means, however, is that it is di¢ cult to make the case, as so many already have in the media and in policy circles, that food price volatility causes political unrest.
Generally speaking, this paper is part of a small literature at the intersection of economics and political science studying the economic determinants of riots (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998; Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010 ). This paper is closest in spirit to a recent paper by Arezki and Brückner (2011) , who look at the relationship between food prices and political instability. The analysis in this paper di¤ers from that of Arezki and Brückner in a few ways. First, this paper relies on monthly food price data, whereas Arezki and Brückner use annual food price data. The advantage of using monthly data is that this allow capturing short-term (i.e., month-to-month) price ‡uctuations. This is important given that people are more likely to react to short-term (i.e., monthly) food price changes than they are to react to long-term (i.e., annual) price changes. The disadvantage of using monthly food price data, however, is that o¢ cial monthly data on political unrest are not available. Arezki and Brückner's advantage is that they can rely on the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide data for their measures of political unrest, whereas this paper relies on a proxy measure of political unrest constructed from media sources. The data limitations inherent to either approach highlight the trade-o¤ between the monthly, international approach in this paper and Arezki and Brückner's annual, country-level approach. As such, the analyses in this paper and in Arezki and Brückner's are complementary.
Given that the world economy is increasingly integrated, an ever higher volume of food commodities are being traded. This means that food prices are increasingly correlated, and so episodes of rising food prices -which are expected to occur more frequently given the threat to agricultural productivity posed by climate change (Lobell et al., 2011 ) -will be increasingly correlated across countries. Thus, if there is a causal relationship between food prices and political unrest, this could ultimately mean that episodes of political unrest will occur simultaneously across countries, which means that food prices have the potential to cause irreversible damage to the health of a¤ected populations by depriving them of nutrients and causing them to be malnourished (Haddad et al., 1999; Webb, 2010) as well as to be a destabilizing geopolitical force. Of course, the results in this paper do not imply that food prices are the only cause of food riots. Goldstone (1982) notes that food riots usually break out when high food prices are accompanied by widespread unemployment. Likewise, the results in this paper do not imply that rising food prices inevitably cause political unrest.
Rather, the objective of this paper is to show that food prices can have a causal impact on political unrest in certain cases.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background by discussing food riots throughout history. In section 3, the empirical framework is laid out and explained. Section 4 discusses the data and presents descriptive statistics. In section 5, the empirical results are presented and discussed, along with the results of several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
Food Riots in History
Throughout history, food riots have been frequent. They are thought to have helped bring about the French Revolution (Rudé, 1964) , the fall of the Confederate States of America (Smith, 2011) , the Russian Revolution (Wade, 2005) , and the fall of the British Raj in India (Arnold, 1979) . Although there are several studies of food riots in the historical and sociological literatures, there are few quantitative studies of food riots other than that by Arezki and Brückner (2011) . In order to put the empirical results in this paper in their proper context, what follows is an overview of food riots in modern and contemporary history. riots were not political in nature. 6 Rather, rioters targeted farmers, merchants, and traders in an e¤ort to force a decrease in food prices. This phenomenon is known to historians as taxation populaire (Tilly, 1971) , i.e., a situation in which farmers, merchants, and traders pay a "popular tax"by forgoing some pro…t or incurring a loss as a consequence of the price ceiling imposed by rioters.
In England where, as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution, a greater share of the 5 For a survey of the social science literature on riots broadly de…ned, see Wilkinson (2009 35) were food riots. Moreover, food riots tended to break out more often in the north and west than in the south and east of England given that food -more speci…cally, grain -was exported from the latter to the former.
A study of more recent food riots is found in Walton and Seddon (1994) , who study the impact of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustment programs on the economies of the developing world between 1970 and the early 1990s. According to Walton and Seddon, even though food riots had largely disappeared from the political landscape after the middle of the 19th century, they reappeared in the 1970s as a consequence of an increasingly integrated world economy in which local food prices were increasingly determined by the international political economy.
Walton and Seddon note that with the exception of Ceylon's hartal in 1953, in which countrywide food riots broke out in response to the government eliminating rice subsidies, there were only few food riots between the middle of the 19th century and the 1970s, 7 and the few that occurred were local, sporadic events. 8 The The "classical"food riots studied by Rudé (1964) often took place in the countryside and involved the rural poor (i.e., individuals and households who remained net buyers of food even though they might have produced some food themselves). By contrast, the "modern" food riots studied by Walton and Seddon (1994) almost always took place in cities and involved the urban poor and the working class (i.e., individuals and households who are net buyers of food). Classical and modern food riots also di¤er in their targets: whereas the targets of classical food riots were local food producers suspected of price gouging and grain merchants suspected of speculating, the targets of modern food riots were supermarkets, government institutions, and symbols of foreign a-uence such as luxury hotels.
While it is still too early for the history of recent food riots to have been written, Schneider 
Empirical Framework
The contribution of this paper lies in the way it identi…es the impact of food prices on political unrest. This section thus …rst discusses on the equations to be estimated, and then the identi…cation strategy used in an attempt to establish the causal impact of food prices on political unrest.
The …rst equation to be estimated in this paper is
where the unit of observation t is one month, y t denotes the level of political unrest in month t; f t denotes the food price level; t denotes three-month food price volatility, i.e., the standard deviation of the price series over the months t, t 1, and t 2; 9;10 y t 1 denotes political unrest in the previous month; m t is a vector of monthly indicator variables in month t; t is a time trend, and t is an error term with mean zero. Because food riots tend to occur in poor countries, where the average diet consists mainly of cereals, equation 1 is estimated twice: once for an index of the overall price of food, and once for an index of the price of cereals. This provides a …rst robustness checks on the empirical results.
The equations in this paper are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Because 9 Letting the three-month moving average of the price series evaluated at t be t = 1 3 P 2 j=0 y t j , the three-month standard deviation is such that t = P 2 j=0 jy t j t j. A three-month food price volatility of zero in a given month would mean that the food price index has remained constant over the last three months. 10 A robustness check is conducted in section 5 which relies instead on six-month food price volatility, i.e., the standard deviation of the price series over the months t to t 5. As was discussed in the introduction, the primary objective of this paper is to assess whether food prices cause political unrest. Because political unrest and food prices are jointly determined, however, the next section discusses the identi…cation strategy used in this paper in an attempt to make a causal statement about the impact of food prices on political unrest.
Identi…cation Strategy
Food prices cannot be argued to be exogenous to political unrest in equation 1. Therefore, some thought must be given as to how to best make a causal statement about the impact of food prices on political unrest. The identi…cation strategy used in this paper relies on the use of an instrumental variable (IV), i.e., a variable that is correlated with food prices but uncorrelated with the error term in equation 1. Such an IV must thus be able to explain food prices without a¤ecting political unrest except through food prices.
The variable used to identify the causal relationship between food prices and political unrest in this paper is the number of natural disasters -de…ned here as drought, episodes of extreme temperature, ‡oods, insect infestations, storms, volcanic eruptions, and wild…res -in a given month. That droughts, episodes of extreme temperature, ‡oods, insect infestations, storms, and wild…res constitute shocks to the supply of food should not be controversial.
That volcanic eruptions should be included among the natural disasters used as an IV, however, is not immediately obvious, but Ó Gráda (2009) and Fraser and Rimas (2010) note that episodes of extreme food scarcity often follow volcanic eruptions.
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The identifying assumption is thus that natural disasters are uncorrelated with 2 in the equation
where b f t is the predicted value of f t obtained from the …rst-stage regression of food prices on natural disasters and all the exogenous covariates in equation 2, such that
where n t is the number of natural disasters in period t, t is an error term with mean zero, as each endogenous variable requires its own instrument. It is thus because there is only one instrument available in this case that the empirical results on the impact of food price volatility on political unrest cannot be argued to be causal in this paper. 12 How are natural disasters a good IV for food prices in the context of equations 2 and 3? Within a given month, natural disasters constitute unpredictable shocks to the supply of and demand for food. 13 Although though the use of rainfall as an IV has recently been questioned due to the predictable nature of rainfall (see the discussion of Miguel et al., 2004 in Sovey and Green, 2011), the natural disasters used in this paper should be unpredictable.
Indeed, although some of the natural disasters included in the IV are more likely in certain seasons (e.g., droughts and ‡oods), the presence of month dummies in equations 1 to 2 should greatly reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the predictability of natural disasters. In other words, within a given month, the number of natural disasters should be unpredictable.
Similarly Likewise, natural disasters could lead to job losses via destroyed capital, which would make it easier to recruit disa¤ected and disenfranchised populations for civil con ‡ict. This cannot be ruled out, but once again, it is unlikely that this can contaminate the empirical results. Indeed, for this to happen, it would need to be the case that a natural disaster directly leads to political unrest in the same region or country as the one in which it takes place, which would in turn require that that region or country is a price maker, i.e., that it has enough market power so as to signi…cantly a¤ect food or cereal prices worldwide. This is in not impossible, but it is highly improbable given the scope of the data, the fact that world markets are well integrated and that only few countries have enough market power to signi…cantly a¤ect the price of food, and the short time frame (i.e., one month) of each observation.
Although it is possible that within a given month, a natural disaster occurs that in ‡u-ences the degree of political unrest within the same month through a variable other than food prices, the dependent variable used in this paper makes this unlikely. Indeed, the dependent variable only measures instances of food-related political unrest, and not of protests, demonstrations, riots, strikes, etc. related to other resources, so the likelihood that n t is correlated with 2t should be relatively low. The next section gives a precise de…nition of the dependent variable as well precise de…nitions of the variables of interest, the IV, and the control variables, along with a discussion of descriptive statistics.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper come from three sources. The measure of political unrest used as the dependent variable is a proxy for actual food-related political unrest. It comes from a
LexisNexis Academic search of all news in English between January 1990 and January 2011
containing at least …ve occurrences of the terms "cereal,""commodity,""food,""grain,"or "staple,"and their plural forms and at least …ve occurrences of the terms "demonstration,"
"mob," "protest," "riot," "strike," "unrest" or "violence" and their plural forms. The "at least …ve occurrences" criterion was applied to each component of the search in an e¤ort to weed out news items such as articles about food worker strikes in the hotel industry, for example. This variable will hereafter be referred to interchangeably as the number of food riots, political unrest, the count of news stories, or the news count.
The number of news sources covered by LexisNexis can vary between time periods as news outlets move in and out of the data base. In this paper, the assumption is that this occurs at random. Alternatively, even if one were to assume that this is a systematic measurement error problem, the identi…cation strategy would account for this. Indeed, in that case, one would observe y 0 t = y t + t , in which case equation 1 would become
where 1t = 1t 1t , the new error term, has two components (i) the usual error term from In the empirical, a natural disaster is recorded in the month when it began. A disaster that unfolded in the current month but which began in an earlier month is thus not recorded as having occurred in the current month. For example, an episode of extreme temperature that begins on April 15 and ends on July 13 is only recorded as having occurred in April.
Natural disasters whose beginning month was coded as "00"(i.e., unknown) in the EM-DAT database were simply dropped from the data because it was impossible to ascribe them to a speci…c month. This assumes that these "month-00"disasters occur at random.
Turning to the descriptive statistics in table 1, the average month sees about 69 mentions of food-related political unrest in the English-language media. This …gure masks a considerable amount of heterogeneity, however, as the number of such mentions ranges from two in 
Estimation Results
Before presenting and discussing estimation results for various speci…cations of equations 1 and 2, it is instructive to start by looking at some nonparametric evidence so as to check whether food prices and political unrest appear correlated at all. In that spirit, …gure 1 plots time series for the food price level, the three-month volatility of the food price level, and for the count of news stories about food riots between January 1990 and January 2011. Figure 1 indicates that spikes in the food price level are often accompanied by a spike in the count of news stories. Spikes in food price volatility, however, seem to follow spikes in food prices. Although this is true by construction -food price volatility is de…ned here as the standard deviation of the food price level time series over the preceding three months, and so a food price spike in a given period should increase food price volatility in the same period, everything else equal -this already casts some doubt on the hypothesis that food price volatility causes political unrest.
Turning to the parametric evidence, the coe¢ cient of correlation between the food price level and the count of news stories is equal to 0.61 and is signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
Likewise, the coe¢ cient of correlation between food price volatility and the count of news stories is equal to 0.30, and it is also signi…cant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, the coe¢ cient of correlation between the cereal price level and the count of news stories is equal to 0.60, the coe¢ cient of correlation between cereal price volatility and the count of news stories is equal to 0.26. Both are signi…cant at the 1 percent level.
Obviously, …gure 1 and the correlation coe¢ cients just discussed fail to control for con- Table 2a presents interesting correlations between food prices and political unrest, but those correlations are just that, and in no way do they imply that food prices actually cause political unrest. Table 2b attempts to make a causal statement about the impact of the food price level on political unrest by presenting estimation results in which natural disasters are used to instrument the food price level. First-stage instrumenting regressions for food prices are presented for these results, but they are omitted from the remainder of the empirical results both for brevity and because they are similar throughout. That is, the number of natural disasters in a given month depresses food prices in the same month. This may come as a surprise to some, but recall that natural disasters can a¤ect the supply of and the demand for food. The fact that natural disasters depress the price of food suggests that natural disasters tend to matter most in regions and countries that produce a negligible amount of food. In such places, the e¤ects of decreased demand for food on the part of large segments of the population a¤ected by natural disasters appear to o¤set the e¤ects of a decrease in the supply of food.
But what matters here is neither the sign nor the magnitude of the impact of natural disasters on food prices but its signi…cance. In both cases, the IV is statistically signi…cant at less than the 1 percent level. In fact, in both columns 1 and 3, the F -statistic on the IV exceeds the threshold of 10 set by Stock and Yogo (2002) for an IV not to be considered weak, which is also true of all of the IV estimation results in this paper. In addition -and The results in tables 2a and 2b indicate also that the reporting of political unrest has been increasing over time, given the sign and signi…cance of the linear time trend, and that the number of news stories about food riots in a given month is correlated with the number of news stories about food riots the previous month. This suggests that political unrest tends to carry over from month to month, but decreasingly so given that the estimated coe¢ cient on the count of news stories in the previous month is less than one.
To make sure that political unrest in the current month is not signi…cantly a¤ected by political unrest in the months before the previous month, table 3 re-estimates the IV speci…cations in columns 3 and 4 of table 2 by including the count of news stories in t 2 and in t 3 as explanatory variables. The estimated coe¢ cients for these two variables are not signi…cant in either speci…cation, and the estimated coe¢ cients for the food price levels and food price volatilities are practically una¤ected by the inclusion of these two variables.
This contrasts with the …ndings in Besley and Burgess (2002) , which imply that Indian state governments are more likely to respond to crop ‡ood damage with humanitarian assistance when there is greater media coverage of the ‡oods in India. In the context of this paper, greater media coverage in t 1, t 2, and t 3 need be associated with a decrease in political unrest in t (via improvements in food prices as a result of public food distribution) given that the data set covers several countries. This could be because the countries in which the media covers political unrest in t 1, t 2, and t 3 are not necessarily the same as the countries in which there is political unrest in t.
The speci…cation in table 4 consider whether the results in table 2b Finally, the appendix presents estimation results for several robustness checks. As regards the IV, to make sure that the results in this paper are robust to alternative de…nitions of "natural disasters,"and to make sure that the results are robust to the way various natural disasters can a¤ect food prices, the results in table A2 progressively exclude speci…c types of natural disasters from the IV. In column 1, volcanic eruptions and wild…res are eliminated given that they appear to be the least likely to a¤ect food prices. Columns 2 to 4 progressively remove storms, insect infestations, and episodes of extreme temperature from the IV. The empirical results are stable across all these alternative de…nitions, for both food and cereal prices.
Following Angrist and Pischke (2008) once again, the speci…cations in table A3 test whether political unrest Granger-causes food prices by including three food price lags as well as three food price leads. The null hypothesis of no Granger causation ‡owing from political unrest to food prices is such that the estimated coe¢ cients for the food prices in t + 1, t + 2, and t + 3 are not signi…cant, save for the second food price lead. This could mean that political unrest Granger-causes food prices, but this appears unlikely given that the coe¢ cient on the second food price lead is only signi…cant at the 9.9 percent level and that all three food price leads are not jointly signi…cant. This is strengthened by the results in the second column of table A3, which show that political unrest does not Granger-cause cereal prices.
Finally, the speci…cations in table A4 take a longer view of price volatility by considering six-instead of three-month food and cereal price volatility. In this case, although the relationship between food price volatility and political unrest is no longer statistically signi…cant, the relationship between food price levels and political unrest is still statistically signi…cant and positive, and of comparable magnitude. In other words, if food price volatility exerts an impact on political unrest, it appears that it is short-term (i.e., three-month)
and not longer-term (i.e., six-month) price volatility that matters, and it appears that the relationship between political unrest and food price volatility, instead of being positive as is so commonly asserted by public commentators, is seemingly negative.
These results thus suggest that whether one considers the food price index or the cereals price index, there appears to be a robust causal relationship ‡owing from the food price level to political unrest, proxied here by the number of news stories about food riots. Likewise, the results suggest that food price volatility -often depicted in the media and by policy makers as the main culprit in causing political unrest -is, if anything, negatively correlated with political unrest, although this relationship cannot be argued to be causal. Put simply, rising food prices appear to cause food riots, and the debate surrounding food prices should be recentered on rising food prices rather than focus on food price volatility.
Conclusion
Do food prices cause political unrest? The results in this paper indicate that the answer to this question is a quali…ed "yes." While rising food prices appear to cause food riots, food price volatility is negatively associated with political unrest. These …ndings go against much of the prevailing rhetoric surrounding food prices. Indeed, whereas many in the media and among policy makers were quick to blame food price volatility for the food riots of 2008
and of 2010-2011, the empirical results in this paper indicate that rising food price levels are to blame and that increases in food price volatility may actually decrease the number of food riots. Moreover, speci…cations that focus on food price volatility at the expense of food price levels show that the latter is not statistically signi…cantly related to the former. These …ndings are in line with those in the applied microeconomics literature on the impacts of rising food prices (Deaton, 1989 ) and of food price volatility (Bellemare et al., 2011) .
What are the implications of these …ndings for policy? First, policy makers should focus on rising food prices, which appear to cause political unrest, rather than on food price volatility, which is actually associated with decreases in political unrest. All of the time and resources that have so far been dedicated to food price volatility would have been better spent on addressing rising food prices. In the future, this means that policies aimed at increasing the supply of food will be the most helpful, whether this means investing in agricultural research aimed at increasing agricultural yields (Dorward et al., 2004) , encouraging urban or peri-urban agriculture (Maxwell, 1995) , liberalizing the international trade of agricultural commodities, increasing access to and the use of biotechnology in developing countries (Paarlberg, 2009 ), eliminating farm subsidies in industrialized countries, and so on.
Second, although it may be tempting to do away with consumer food price subsidies in the current context of budget austerity, policy makers should be very cautious when trying to eliminate such subsidies. Indeed, in many developing countries, local political economy considerations introduce a systematic bias in favor of urban households when it comes to food policy, which pushes governments to subsidize the price of food in an e¤ort to keep urban discontent at bay (Lipton, 1977; Bates, 1981) . Given that food riots almost always occur in urban areas, however, abandoning these food price subsidies may be ill-advised, especially since these policies often appear to have been put in place to avoid food riots in the …rst place. In such cases, a better policy may be one that progressively abandons food price subsidies. This is especially so given that it is likely that individuals exhibit loss aversion over food prices (Timmer, 2010) , i.e., for equal-valued increases and decreases in food prices, the welfare losses caused by price increases are larger in magnitude than the welfare gains caused by price decreases.
Although food prices are determined on international markets by forces beyond the control of national governments, policy responses to rising food prices are within the hands of national governments and should respond to local contexts. What type of policy is bestsuited to each of those contexts will have to rely on analyses conducted at a more micro level. For now, this type of analysis is left for future research. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to assess whether the error term is serially correlated. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002 The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 250 observations, three observations are lost because of the use of the dependent variable in t -1, t -2, and t -3 as regressors. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002 The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002 The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, one observations is lost because of the use of the dependent variable in t -1 as a regressor. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002) . The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002 The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, two observations are lost because food price three-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t, t -1, and t -2. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002 The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, six observations are lost because food price lags and lead are calculated using food prices in t -3, to t + 3. The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. With respect to the full sample of 253 observations, five observations are lost because food price six-month volatility is calculated using food prices in t to t -5. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is weak (Stock and Yogo, 2002) .
